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Abstract
We examine the effects of a rural electrification program on
employment in Peru. Exploiting the roll-out of the program across
districts over time, we adopt differences-in-differences and fixed-
effects strategies to estimate the impact of the program on la-
bor market outcomes. The results from our preferred specifica-
tion suggest that, among males, providing electrification increases
hours of work and diminishes the likelihood of having a second oc-
cupation. Among females, the treatment rises earnings and these
gains seem to be driven by a shift towards non-agricultural jobs.
Then, we construct a measure of treatment intensity and show
that each additional electrification project increases the magni-
tude of the estimated impacts (in absolute terms).
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1 INTRODUCTION
Access to services such as water, electricity and telecommunications
seems to be key to generate welfare improvements in rural areas. Many
governments in developing countries allocate large amounts of money
to finance infrastructure projects as an attempt to boost economic de-
velopment in poor areas. These efforts have led to a recent increase
in the studies which empirically examine the link between access to
public infrastructure and the well-being of poor families.
In 2006, 39 percent of rural households in Peru had access to elec-
tricity. The government rapidly increased electricity coverage in the
last decade through the Rural Electrification Program (knowns as PER,
for its name in Spanish). Since these families largely depend on the la-
bor market to meet their consumption plans, in this study we focus
on the effects of electrification on employment. In particular, we ex-
ploit the timing of the implementation of the program to shed light on
the labor market consequences of rural electrification. In the absence
of an experimental design, our approach consists of using two identi-
fication strategies: Differences-in-Differences and Fixed-Effects. For
the former, we use seven repeated cross-sections of the Peruvian na-
tional household survey during the period 2006-2012. For the latter,
we utilize a unique household panel data set collected between 2007
and 2010.
Electricity provision can affect employment through different chan-
nels. First, it can be thought of as a technological shock that improves
household production. Second, it implies a larger time endowment be-
cause everyone can work during the night (and not only during the
day). Third, it could promote the start of new businesses by allow-
ing households to produce goods and services that require appliances.
Fourth, it might increase the time spent watching TV (Olken 2009).
Since the theoretical prediction of access to electricity on labor supply
is ambiguous, we empirically examine the total effect of electrification
on several employment outcomes.
We document the following impacts of the program on labor market
outcomes. Our preferred specification suggests that men in treated ar-
eas reallocate their time devoted to work as follows: they work harder
(2.5 additional hours per week) in their main occupation but are less
likely to have a second job (a reduction of 6 percentage points). Among
women, our estimates indicate that treatment increases earnings and
hourly wages by around 30 percent. Additional evidence suggests that
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these gains are driven by a lower probability of working in agriculture.
Since male earnings were unaffected, these estimates imply that the
program reduced the gender wage gap in treated districts. We then
construct a measure of treatment intensity and show that the impacts
of the program are larger in areas where more projects were concluded.
These findings represent our contribution to the literature that exam-
ines the role of electricity provision on labor markets in developing
countries.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the
related literature. Section 3 describes the program. Section 4 outlines
the empirical strategies. Section 5 gives the details of our data. Section
6 displays our results. Section 7 offers concluding remarks.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
A growing literature examines the consequences of providing the poor
with public infrastructure and services such as roads, water, electricity,
phones, and internet. This empirical literature has documented that
such public projects have positive effects on the well-being of rural fam-
ilies. Overall, these investments in public infrastructure and services
allow the poor to have access to markets, and information. In the next
paragraphs we discuss with further detail the contributions and limi-
tations of the existing literature. First, we review studies that provide
evidence from Peru on the association between electricity, phones and
mobile phones on labor supply, agricultural production, and consump-
tion. We conclude this section with a discussion of previous studies
which look at the impact of electrification on employment, industrial-
ization, and development.
A couple of observational studies provide evidence on the associ-
ation between access to electricity and work decisions in rural Peru.
Escobal (2005) makes a first attempt to document correlations between
access to infrastructures and labor income in rural areas. Using match-
ing techniques, he finds that access to electricity and roads is positively
associated with: i) total hours of work, ii) the share of time spent in
non-agricultural activities, and iii) the likelihood of working in wage
activities. Thus, infrastructure provision not only affects the level of
hours of work but also allows rural households to have more diversi-
fied income portfolios.
Torero et al. (2007) analyze how the privatization of electricity com-
panies affects the quality of the service and its impact on hours of work.
3
That is, they compare households whose service is provided by a pri-
vate firm versus families whose supplier is a public firm. Based on
matching estimates, their results indicate that rural households under
private provision of electricity have more opportunities to work in non-
farm activities, and as a result, the share of time in non-farm activities
increases.
More recently, Beuermann (2011) estimates the impact of provid-
ing phones to isolated rural villages. This intervention was carried
out by the Peruvian Fund for Investments in Telecommunications (FI-
TEL, for its name in Spanish) during 2001 and 2004. The author uses
village-level panel data and exploits differences in the timing of the
intervention across villages to identify the impact of phones on agri-
cultural profitability and child labor. His results suggest that access to
phones increases agricultural profitability by 20 percent, and reduces
agricultural child labor by 9 percentage points.
Beuermann et al. (2012) study the impact of mobile phone coverage
on consumption and the value of assets. They construct patterns of
coverage at the village-level during 2001 through 2007. After matching
this information to household outcomes, they find that access to mobile
phones increases consumption by 7.5 percent, and the value of assets
by 13.5 percent.
The studies which use data from Peru indicate that infrastructure
projects have positive effects on the well-being of rural families. The
first two papers rely on matching techniques while the others use panel
data to recover their parameters of interest. Our empirical work will
add to this literature by examining how access to electricity affects em-
ployment and earnings in rural areas of Peru using exogenous vari-
ation in the placement of an electrification program that took place
during 2006 and 2010. Next, we consider three studies that are closely
related to ours.
First, Dinkelman (2011) estimates the impact of electricity provi-
sion in rural areas of South Africa during 1990-2007. He takes advan-
tage of the roll-out of the electrification program in South Africa, done
by ESKOM, the electricity utility. Between 1993 and 2003, about US
$1.4 billion was spent on household electrification and about 470,000
households were electrified. The community-level selection of the pro-
gram was not random so the author relies on two empirical strate-
gies using data at the community level. First, he uses land gradi-
ent as an instrument for program placement and then estimates the
impact of electrification on employment. Second, the author adopts
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a fixed-effects estimator to remove time-invariant unobservable that
may jointly affect program placement and employment. Based on both
techniques, he finds evidence on significant effects of household electri-
fication on employment. His results indicate that electrification leads
to an increase in female employment in both the extensive and inten-
sive margin. He also shows that women’s wages fall while male earn-
ings go up. The main weakness of the study is that there is systematic
migration of people from non-treated areas to electrified communities.
These migration patterns inflate the reported estimates and also af-
fect the interpretation of the results. In spite of this limitation, this
paper clearly shows that infrastructure has important effects on labor
markets in developing countries.
Second, Rud (2012) evaluate the link between electricity provision
and industrialization in India during the period 1965-1984. To over-
come endogeneity concerns, he uses the start of the Green Revolution,
an agricultural technology intense in irrigation introduced in the 60s as
a natural experiment. In particular, he predicts electricity expansion
using (initial) groundwater availability in the 60s. The author docu-
ments the existence of a first-stage and then uses IV to estimate the
impact of electricity provision on industrial output. His results suggest
that an increase in electrification provision is associated with an in-
crease in manufacturing output. He also finds that places with higher
access to electricity have more factories and output among small firms.
Third, Libscomb et al. (2013) analyze the effects of electrification
on the Human Development Index (HDI) using county-level data from
Brazil. The authors also rely on geographic characteristics to adopt
an IV approach. More specifically, they simulate how the electricity
grid would have evolved if its expansion had only take into account
geographic cost considerations (water flow and river gradient), ignor-
ing demand-side considerations. Then, they use this forecast as an
instrument for actual program placement. The validity of their strat-
egy relies on the assumption that cost-side determinants can be fully
separated from demand-side concerns. Namely, they assume that costs
are not related to demand levels for electricity. Their results indicate
that electricity provision is associated with higher levels of HDI. More-
over, their analysis suggests that migration is unlikely to account for
the large magnitude of development gains observed. They also esti-
mate large, positive effects of electrification on employment, salaries,
and investments in education, but not health.
These three papers use geographic characteristics as instruments
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for program placement. That is, they assume that land gradient, ground-
water availability and river gradient do not have direct effects on em-
ployment, industrialization and development, respectively. For instance,
Dinkelman (2011) assumes that land gradient do not affect the likeli-
hood of engaging in labor-intensive activities such as agriculture. Al-
ternatively, Rud (2012) rules out that manufacturing output can grow
faster simply because of access to groundwater and not because of elec-
trification. These limitations are unavoidable given the difficulty in
solving the endogenous nature of infrastructure investments. In this
paper, we also have to deal with the non-random allocation of the pro-
gram. More specifically, we use two empirical strategies, DD and FE
to examine the employment response to electrification in rural Peru.
Our paper add to this literature by using individual-level data instead
of aggregate data. Also, our data have detailed information on labor
outcomes that allow us to identify the channels through which electri-
fication affects employment in rural areas of Peru.
3 THE PROGRAM
In 1993, the Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mines launched the Ru-
ral Electrification Program (PER, for its name in Spanish) as an at-
tempt to foster social and economic development in rural areas. The
implementation of the program began after the enactment of the “Act
of Rural Electrification”. According to this Act, the main objective of
the PER is to provide rural families with electricity, with the support
of the private sector, public institutions, and local governments.
The PER was not randomly assigned across districts. Instead, the
Ministry used the following set of variables to identify eligible districts:
• Lower index of rural electrification (percentage of households with
electricity)
• Higher poverty rate (percentage of households whose consump-
tion is below the poverty line)
• Lower proportion of the estimated subsidy per connection
• Lower cost per connection
• Higher use of renewable energy
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Based on these dimensions, they defined the roll-out of the program.
However, the program did not expand according to these criteria be-
cause every time new data was released (or new authorities got elected
to work for the Ministry) the initial plans were changed. In fact, the
Ministry divided the PER in two sub-periods: 1993-2004 and 2005-
2010. The first sub-period was based on variables constructed using the
census of 1993. The second sub-period used data from three sources:
census 1993, census 2005, and the poverty map of 2007.
In this paper, we focus on the projects that were concluded in the
period 2006-2010 for two reasons. First, most of the projects were con-
cluded in this period (due to rapid economic growth and high politi-
cal stability). Second, the Institute of National Statistics (INEI for its
name in Spanish) collected a unique household panel data set during
this same period.
We present the evolution of electricity coverage in Figure 1. We
estimate it using data from the ENAHO, including only rural districts
1. In only seven years, it jumped from 39 percent to 68 percent. The
figure shows that access to electricity in rural areas roughly grew by 5
percentage points per year in the study period. The program aims to
provide electricity to 95 percent of rural households by 2021.
So far, 628 electrification projects have been concluded throughout
rural Peru. To illustrate, we present the timing of the program in Fig-
ure 2. The distribution of the projects according to its type is as follows:
i) 55 transmission lines with a length of 2,872 kilometers; ii) 299 rural
electrical systems whose total length is 20,000 kilometers ); iii) 268 hy-
dropower plants; iv) 4 projects that included the installation of 1,523
solar panels; and v) 2 wind-turbines. The total cost of these projects is
US$ 657.5 million.
4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES
As mentioned in the previous section, the PER did not have an experi-
mental design. Therefore, any difference in outcomes between treated
and non-treated households would be a biased estimate of the effect
of the program. To deal with unobserved confounders, we rely on two
non-experimental methods to estimate the impact of PER on employ-
ment. First, we utilize repeated cross-sections and adopt a Differences-
in-Differences (DD) approach. Second, we use household panel data
1The data consists of seven annual cross sections of the ENAHO.
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and apply a Fixed Effects (FE) estimation. In both cases, non-treated
and treated households would be referred to as the control and treat-
ment group, respectively (bear in mind that the treatment is defined
at the district level). Each approach has its identifying assumptions
and data requirements which we describe with further detail in the
next subsections. Both methods could be biased if there is systematic
migration across areas. For example, migration would lead to “contam-
ination”, which refers to the fact that some individuals from the con-
trol group may receive the treatment and vice-versa. Given that FE
not only captures district-level unobservable characteristics but also
individual-level heterogeneity, we refer to it as our preferred specifica-
tion.
4.1 DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES (DD)
The DD approach exploits the roll-out of the program to remove per-
manent differences across control and treated districts. That is, the
DD estimator solves the problem of endogenous program placement
under the assumption that the selection bias is additive and does not
vary over time.
To fix ideas, let i = 1, 2, ..., N , j = 1, 2, ...M , and t = 1, 2, ..., T de-
note, individuals, districts and years, respectively. This setup lead us
to estimate the following equation:
yijt = αj + αt + α1dijt +
T∑
t=2
βt(dijt ∗ αt) +X ′ijtγ + µijt (1)
where yijt is the outcome variable (participation, hours of work, and so
on); αj and αt denote district and year fixed effects; dijt indicates that
the individual lives in a district where at least one project has been
concluded by year t; Xijt is a vector of characteristics (such as maternal
language, education, and so on), and βt are the parameters of interest.
The error term is denoted by µijt and is allowed to be correlated across
individuals within districts.
Though the data from electrification projects are defined at the dis-
trict level, our treatment indicator varies at the individual level be-
cause not all individuals were treated in the same year. This within-
district variation allows us to include district fixed effects which, among
other things, capture geographic characteristics that are relevant to de-
termine the cost of each project (and therefore the placement of the pro-
gram). The crucial assumption to obtain consistent estimates is that,
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in the absence of the treatment, employment trends would have been
the same in treated and control districts. Based on the criteria used by
the Ministry (see section 3), this assumption sounds plausible.
We should note that we fail to identify which households are ac-
tually beneficiaries of the program. Therefore, our results should be
interpreted as “Intent-To-Treat” (ITT) estimates. In other words, we
estimate the (overall) effect of providing electricity at the district level
instead of measuring the impact of actually receiving it. Moreover, note
that by construction the ITT estimate is year-specific.
Around one third of treated districts received more than one elec-
trification project in the study period. Thus, we are able to construct
a measure of “treatment intensity” among treated districts that varies
over time. More formally, we also run:
yijt = αj + αt + φ ∗ Intensityjt +X ′ijtγ + νijt (2)
where Intensity measures the cumulative number of concluded projects
in district j by year t and all the other variables are defined as in equa-
tion (1) 2. The coefficient φ measures the marginal impact of concluding
one additional project, conditional on being exposed to the program.
The identifying assumption of equation (2) is that our measure of in-
tensity is uncorrelated with the error term once we control for district
and year fixed effects, and individual characteristics.
4.2 FIXED-EFFECTS (FE)
Rather than using repeated cross-sections, the FE approach requires to
follow the same individuals over time. The advantage of having panel
data is that we can estimate the following equation:
yijt = λi + λj + λt + ρeijt + ηijt (3)
where yijt is the dependent variable, λj and λt denote district and year
fixed effects, eijt indicates that the individual lives in a district where
at least one project has been concluded by year t, and ηijt is the er-
ror term, which is allowed to be correlated within individuals across
periods. The main difference with respect to equations (1) and (2), is
the inclusion of an individual fixed effect denoted by λi, which captures
2In other words, our measure of intensity is not the number of projects concluded
each year. Instead, is the cumulative number of projects concluded by year (i.e. it is
increasing over time).
9
unobserved individual heterogeneity. The price of doing so is that we
cannot include individual controls that do not vary over time such as
district/year of birth, maternal language, sex, and education. Recall
that FE is our preferred specification because it is robust to the inclu-
sion of individual fixed effects.
Hence, the key assumption to apply a FE strategy is that unob-
served confounders are time-invariant3. Given that program place-
ment was determined by district characteristics that were measured at
some point of time (which allows us to think of them as time-invariant
variables), the identifying assumption of the FE approach seems to be
reasonable.
Finally, we run the FE analogous of equation (2). That is:
yijt = λi + λj + λt + pi ∗ Intensityijt + εijt (4)
where all variables are defined in a similar fashion. The interpretation
of the parameter pi is the same of φ from equation (2): the effect of
concluding one additional electrification project, conditional on being
exposed to the treatment.
5 DATA
Our primary data source is the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (hence-
forth, ENAHO) conducted by the INEI on a yearly basis. This survey
includes comprehensive information at both the household and indi-
vidual level. The ENAHO is representative at the national, urban and
rural level.
For the DD approach, we pool repeated cross-sections for the period
2006-2012. For the FE strategy, we use a unique household panel data
set for the period 2007-2010. The sample size of the former is much
larger than the latter. In both cases, we focus on rural districts.
The dependent variables are taken from the ENAHO employment
record (in which all individuals over 14 are interviewed). We construct
nine labor market outcomes for the empirical analysis: i) participation;
ii) employment; iii) hours of work; iv) log earnings; v) log hourly wages;
vi) whether the individual has two jobs; vii) whether he is a wage-
3We distinguish the individual fixed effect from the district fixed effect only to
illustrate the main difference with respect to the DD approach. However, in prac-
tice, they are not distinguishable because individuals in our panel do not migrate.
Therefore, the district of residence is captured in the individual fixed effect.
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earner; viii) whether he works in agriculture; and ix) whether he is
self-employed (see the Appendix for further details).
The vector of controls used in the DD approach is taken from the
ENAHO education record. It includes characteristics such as maternal
language, sex, age, and education level (for more details see the Ap-
pendix). We also include an indicator variable for the presence of chil-
dren below 5 in the household, taken from the demographics record.
The list of electrification projects that were concluded between 2006
and 2010 was taken from administrative records of the Ministry of En-
ergy and Mines. In our study period, 567 projects (out of 628) were
concluded in 412 rural districts. For each project, we observe the year
of conclusion, and the treated districts (101 projects include more than
one district). However, we are unable to distinguish between types of
projects (e.g., transmission lines versus hydropower plants).
Treated districts are defined as follows. We say that a district is
treated by year t if at least one project had been concluded in that
year or earlier. In addition, our measure of treatment intensity is the
cumulative number of concluded projects by year. For instance, if a
district has one project per year, from 2007 to 2010, its intensity mea-
sure would be as follows: 1,2,3,4 (see Figure 3 to check how intensity
varies by area). Then, we use unique district identifiers, year of in-
terview and year of conclusion of each project to match both data sets.
After this matching, our final DD and FE samples include 246,735 and
12,964 individuals, respectively.
Table 1 shows the evolution of electricity coverage by area (treated
and non-treated). In both samples, we note that initial coverage was
lower in treated areas than in control districts, which is consistent with
the criteria used by the Ministry. When looking at the DD sample, we
see that treated areas experienced a rapid growth in access to electric-
ity: coverage went from 26 percent in 2006 to 67 percent in 2012. A
similar expansion in access to electricity is observed when we use the
panel sample. Control areas also experienced an increase in access to
electricity during the study period, which supports the common-trend
assumption needed to correctly estimate the impact of the program.
To show that the program led to higher electricity coverage, we
regress (actual) access to electricity on the treatment variable, and on
our measure of intensity. Table 2 reports the corresponding estimates
for both samples. Columns 1 and 3 document the positive and highly
significant impact of the treatment on access to electricity: coverage in
treated districts is roughly 8 percentage points higher than in control
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areas. Similarly, columns 2 and 4 indicate that, conditional on being ex-
posed to the program, each additional electrification project increases
coverage by 2.5 and 3.5 percentage points in the DD and panel sample,
respectively. Taken together, these results suggest that our ITT and in-
tensity variables are strongly correlated to actual access to electricity.
6 RESULTS
6.1 DD RESULTS
The DD results for the whole sample are shown in Table 3. Panel A
displays the ITT estimates for each year on the nine labor market out-
comes. In general, the point estimates are very small and not signif-
icantly different from zero. Only the projects that were concluded in
2010 appear to have a modest impact on the probability of having two
jobs and the likelihood of being wage-earner (see columns 6 and 7, re-
spectively). The coefficient in column 6 indicates that treated individ-
uals are less likely to have two jobs than people living in non-treated
areas. In column 7, we see that the treatment slightly increases the
likelihood of being wage-earner by 0.8 percentage points. In Panel B,
we present the estimated impact of concluding one additional electrifi-
cation project, conditional on being exposed to the program. Our find-
ings suggest that treatment intensity only has a significant effect on
hours of work and the probability of working in agriculture.
Table 4 reports the estimated effects of electrification only for men.
Our results indicate that the program does not affect participation or
employment rates (columns 1 and 2). We do find a positive but small
(and barely significant) effect on weekly hours of work: projects that
were concluded in 2009 increases labor supply by 0.8 hours. Columns
6, 7, and 9 suggest that providing electricity reduces the likelihood of
having two jobs, and increases the probability of being wage-earner
and self-employed, respectively. Though the estimates are highly sig-
nificant, they are small in magnitude. Panel B shows that participation
and employment rates decrease at a very low pace as we add electrifi-
cation projects.
In Table 5, we present the ITT estimates for the female sample. In
the top half, we see that electrification projects have no impact on la-
bor market outcomes except for self-employment. Column 9 shows that
projects concluded in 2008 reduce the likelihood of being self-employed
by 1.7 percentage points. The bottom half of Table 5 exhibits that hours
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of work and the likelihood of working in agriculture change as we con-
clude additional projects. Our measure of intensity suggests that labor
supply goes up by 0.2 hours of work with each additional project while
the probability of working in agriculture goes down by 0.6 percentage
points as intensity increases.
Youth employment (workers between 14-25 years old) is pervasive
in rural areas and, therefore, is relevant to have a closer look at it.
Panel A in Table 6 presents ITT estimates of the program among the
youth. These results show that young workers are not affected by the
program in most dimensions. Columns 7 and 8 indicate that the treat-
ment increases the probability of being wage-earner (projects that were
concluded in 2007) and decreases the likelihood of working in agricul-
ture (projects that were concluded in 2008), respectively. When looking
at Panel B, we do not find significant effects which may suggest that
youth employment is less sensitive to treatment intensity than adult
employment.
In short, the DD estimates imply that the program have little im-
pact on labor market outcomes. First, the PER reduces the likelihood
of having a second occupation and slightly rises the chances of being
wage-earner in the sample as a whole. Second, the treatment seems to
increase male’s hours of work but the point estimate is small. Third,
electrification projects tend to decrease the probability of being self-
employed among women. Fourth, the probability of being wage-earner
goes up and the chances of working in agriculture go down among
young people in treated districts. Now, we turn to discuss the results
of our preferred specification.
6.2 FE RESULTS
Table 7 reports the estimated effects of the PER for the whole sample.
Panel A displays the ITT estimates and Panel B shows the estimates
of treatment intensity. The ITT estimates suggest that the program
did not have a significant impact on participation and employment
rates, earnings, the likelihood of being wage-earner nor the probabil-
ity of working in agriculture. However, providing electricity increases
hours of work, reduces the likelihood of having two jobs, and rises the
chances of being self-employed (see columns 3, 6, and 9, respectively).
More specifically, weekly hours of work go up by almost two hours; the
probability of having two jobs decreases by 3 percentage points; and in-
dividuals who live in treated areas are more likely to be self-employed
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by more than 3 percentage points. Qualitatively, these effects indicate
that individuals who benefit from the program choose to work harder
as independent workers but are less likely to have two jobs. Panel B of
Table 7 shows that the impact on hours of work and the likelihood of
having two jobs is larger (in absolute terms) as we add electrification
projects. Conditional on being exposed to the program, each additional
project increases labor supply by 0.5 hours of work and decreases the
likelihood of having two jobs by roughly 2 percentage points. These
results suggest that the effects of electrification on these outcomes are
increasing on the number of projects that each district received.
The point estimates for the male sample are presented in Table 8.
Panel A reports statistically significant impacts on hours of work, the
likelihood of having two jobs and the probability of working in agri-
culture. The coefficient in column 3 suggests that providing electricity
increases male labor supply by 2.6 hours of work (per week). A neg-
ative effect on the likelihood of having two jobs is shown in column
6: treated male individuals are 6 percentage points less likely to have
two jobs than men in the control group. These two coefficients are twice
larger than those for the sample as a whole. Finally, the point estimate
in column 8 reveals that the program increased the probability of work-
ing in agriculture by 5 percentage points. The bottom half of Table 8
indicates that each additional project has a positive impact on male’s
hours of work. This increase leads to a mechanical reduction of hourly
wages of 8 percent with each new project (given that earnings remain
unchanged). Column 6 shows that increase in treatment intensity also
reduces the likelihood of having two jobs by 2.4 percentage points.
In Table 9, we focus on the effects of electrification on female la-
bor market outcomes. If we look at Panel A, we notice interesting dif-
ferences with respect to men. First, employment rates go up by 3.5
percentage points in treated districts. Second, providing electricity in-
creases earnings and hourly wages by around 35 percent. Third, the
treatment diminishes the likelihood of working in agriculture by al-
most 4 percentage points (which is consistent with the findings of Es-
cobal, 2005 and Torero et al. 2007). Fourth, women in treated areas are
more likely to be self-employed than their counterparts in the control
group. The estimated coefficients in Panel B suggest that an additional
electrification project increases female earnings by 10 percent and re-
duces the probability of having two jobs by 1.3 percentage points. Our
results then indicate that women in treated districts with, for instance,
two projects earn 40 percent more than women in control areas. These
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gains in earnings appear to be very large and should have a positive im-
pact on the gender wage gap given that male earnings do not response
to the treatment nor to its intensity.
Table 10 shows the estimated impacts of electrification on youth em-
ployment (workers age 14-25). In the top half, we find no statistically
significant effects except for the likelihood of having two jobs. The point
estimate in column 6 suggests that treatment diminishes the probabil-
ity of working in two jobs by 5.5 percentage points. The bottom half
of Table 10 reveals that treatment intensity have a positive impact on
earnings (10 percent) and a negative effect on the likelihood of having
two jobs (1.3 percentage points).
To sum up, our panel data estimates suggest that, in the sample as
a whole, the treatment increases hours of work, diminishes the likeli-
hood of having two jobs and rises the probability of being self-employed.
These results may indicate that rural electrification increases the ben-
efits of labor specialization (i.e. it is less attractive to have more than
one job) and encourages the start of new businesses (i.e. people are
more likely to be self-employed). However, the estimated coefficients
are modest in magnitude. When we split the sample by sex, our re-
sults show that the program have positive impacts on male’s hours of
work and female’s earnings. Among the youth, the program reduces
the likelihood of working in two jobs. Finally, the analysis of treatment
intensity reveals that each additional project reinforces such impacts.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Governments in developing countries devote a significant share of their
resources to invest in public infrastructure. In fact, providing access to
basic services such as water sanitation, electricity, and telecommuni-
cations is one of the top priorities in their policy agendas.
In this paper, we examine the labor market consequences of pro-
viding electrification to rural districts using individual-level data from
Peru. To deal with the endogenous placement of the electrification pro-
gram, we adopt differences-in-differences and fixed-effects strategies.
We therefore assume that unobserved confounders are time-invariant
at the district and individual level, respectively.
Both estimation strategies yield qualitatively similar estimates. Our
ITT estimates suggest that the treatment increases hours of work and
decreases the likelihood of having more than one job among males. One
potential explanation for this result is that the electrification program
15
raises the benefits of specializing and therefore makes it less attractive
to have a second occupation. It seems as if electricity increases avail-
able time to work and economies of scale increase the payoff of focusing
on one occupation instead of having two. Among women, we document
that earnings are higher in treated areas than in control districts. In-
terestingly, these gains appear to be driven by a lower probability of
working in agriculture. Taken together, these pieces of evidence sug-
gest that the program reduced the gender wage gap among beneficia-
ries. Moreover, our measure of treatment intensity indicates that the
size of these effects (for both men and women) increases as more elec-
trification projects are concluded.
Let us recall two caveats of our empirical analysis. First, the valid-
ity of our strategies rests on the assumption that selection bias takes
the form of unobserved time-invariant characteristics. Second, we fail
to account for potential systematic migration that could bias our re-
sults. For instance, our estimated increase in hours of work could be
driven by migration of hard-working men from control areas to treated
districts.
Future work should look at the impact of electrification on educa-
tional outcomes. Access to electricity could be thought of as shock to
school quality which, in turn, may affect the demand for education.
Also, electrification could affect health outcomes through better equip-
ments at health centers or less demand for in-door polluting technolo-
gies (e.g. replacing wood/candles for electrical appliances/lightbulbs).
Future research on such outcomes would be important to understand
the overall effect of electrification on the lives of the rural poor.
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Table 1: Estimated Electricity Coverage in Rural Peru using ENAHO
samples.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
DD Sample:
Treated areas 26% 38% 43% 52% 54% 62% 67%
Non-treated areas 45% 54% 60% 60% 63% 66% 68%
Panel Sample:
Treated areas - 44% 50% 58% 65% - -
Non-treated areas - 53% 55% 56% 60% - -
Table 2: The Effects of the PER on Access to Electricity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DD Sample Panel Sample
ITT 0.0819*** 0.0750***
(0.0169) (0.0093)
Intensity 0.0247*** 0.0354***
(0.0091) (0.0034)
Observations 246,735 145,655 12,964 7,247
R-squared 0.4641 0.3946 0.0751 0.1470
Number of individuals 3,980 2,234
Note: Clustered standard errors are shown in parenthesis. Each column is a separate regression. The
dependent variable is equal to 1 if the household has electricity, and 0 otherwise. All regressions control
for district and year fixed effects. Columns 1 and 3 include all rural families, both control and treated
households. Columns 2 and 4 only include individuals who were exposed to, at least, one electrification
project in their district.
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Appendix
• Abbreviations:
– PER: Rural Electrification Program
– ENAHO: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (Peruvian National Household
Survey)
– DD: Differences-in-Differences
– FE:Fixed Effects
– ITT: Intent to Treat
• Dependent variables:
– Participation: equal to 1 if the individual is in the labor force, and equal
to 0 otherwise
– Employed: equal to 1 if the individual is in employed, and equal to 0
otherwise
– Hours of work: Equal to the hours of work in the week previous to the
interview. It is zero for those who do not work.
– Log Earnings: weekly earnings are computed only for those who reported
positive values of income (dependent and independent workers). In-kind
payments are ignored.
– Log hourly wages: only computed for those who reported positive values
of income and non-zero hours of work.
– Has 2 jobs: equal to 1 if the individual has two jobs, and equal to 0 other-
wise
– Wage-Earner: equal to 1 if the individual is a wage-earner , and equal to
0 otherwise
– Agriculture: equal to 1 if the individual works in agriculture and equal
to 0 otherwise
– Self-employed: equal to 1 if the individual is self-employed, and equal to
0 otherwise
• Control variables:
– Children: equal to 1 if there are children below 5 in the household, and 0
otherwise
– Maternal language: equal to 1 if the individual speaks Quechua, and 0
otherwise
– Sex: equal to 1 if the individual is male, and 0 otherwise
– Age: age of the individual at the year of interview (measured in years)
– Education level dummies (no education, incomplete primary, complete
primary, incomplete secondary, and so on
– District and year fixed effects
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